| Charles Ferguson (Left) and Charles Morris |
With two films in three years, Charles Ferguson has emerged as the name in non-fiction political filmmaking. Mr. Fergsuon, who has been a policy advisor, a technology company owner, and now, a documentary filmmaker. His 2007 film, No End in Sight, took on the very complicated issue of the Iraq War, and, without ever launching into muckraking techniques, explained the crucial mistakes that had led to the disaster it was turning out to be. Mr. Ferguson’s new film, Inside Job, takes on another political issue—the 2008 financial crisis, which is explained in stunning detail with a number of amazing interviews that put the entire crisis into a shocking context. After a press screening, Mr. Ferguson sat down along with one of the documentary’s subjects Charlie Morris, the writer of The Trillion Dollar Meltdown: Easy Money, High Rollers and the Great Credit Card Crash, which predicted the crisis months before it happened, to talk about the making of the film and the future of our current crisis.
One of the things that struck me about the film was the through line that starts in the late 70s and early 80s that goes through Republicans through Democrats, back to Republicans, and now to Democrats. In a way, supposedly when considering how partisan our government is today, it seems in this one area there’s a lot of agreement.
Ferguson: Unfortunately yes. The basic problem is definitely disturbing…I think that the problem is fully and completely bipartisan also makes it much more difficult for people to understand what to do.
What happen to the whistleblowers like Charlie [Morris] and the others, the people who were talking, like Alan Sloan and a few others you point out? How do people look at them now?
Morris: There’s a person in the film, [Raghuram Rajan], at the University of Chicago of all places. He was at the 2005 IMF conference, run by Alan Greenspan. He gave a paper that said you guys are heading for the biggest crash we’ve ever seen, and he laid out chapter and verse on how and when it was going to happen. And people like [Former Harvard President and Former Director of the White House National Economic Council] Larry Summers stood up and called him names, and he was almost booed off the platform. And I think even now he doesn’t get a lot of credit for it. I mean people like us know, but he’s not known for that kind of thing. But when the crisis finally hit, it was such a God-awful mess that no one could point to anyone about any of it.
Clearly when you are making a film like this and you’re interviewing so many people, word has to get around like “Hey there’s this guy Charles Ferguson, made this well regarded film about Iraq, and he’s asking a lot of questions.” Why didn’t people talk—did you do them all on the same day?
Ferguson: I was terrified that would be a problem, and in some cases it was. Some of the people who declined to be interviewed clearly knew what I was doing and didn’t like it. In the case of [Columbia Business School professors] Glenn Hubbard and Frederic Mishkin, we interviewed them three days apart, Hubbard first, and I crossed my fingers for 72 hours that they weren’t going to talk during that period. One thing—this is funny and it’s also not funny—what helped me in this regard, in the case of Hubbard and some others who aren’t even in the film, is that they were so embarrassed and ashamed, and fearful, at the end of their interviews, the last thing they wanted to do was tell everyone what had happened.
In the downfall of Lehman and the downfall of [Henry] Paulson [Former Goldman Sachs CEO and Treasury Secretary from 2006-2009], why didn’t you look at some of the antagonism in why he decided not to save it?
Ferguson: The question of why Lehman was forced into bankruptcy is like one of those questions, “Why did the Bush administration start the Iraq war?” There’s 20 possible explanations, each of them probably has some degree of truth. I would love to be Henry Paulson’s psychiatrist, and unfortunately I’m not. But let me give you the list. One is everyone hated [Lehman CEO] Richard Fuld. I’ve never met him myself; he obviously declined to be interviewed. He just about antagonized everyone on the entire planet, which is his personality—arrogant, abrasive etc. The second is unlike most of the other Wall St firms, the top management of Lehman Brothers with just one exception—a cousin of President Bush—was composed primarily Democrats, who were substantial contributors to the Democratic party. Third, Paulson did care about the moral hazard argument and wanted to make an example of his company. Fourth, which is clearly true, is that he didn’t have the faintest God damn idea of how much Lehman’s bankruptcy would cause. Fifth—there’s a lot—that Lehman had been emerging over the previous decade to a competitor to Goldman Sachs. Finally, there’s also the possibility that there was an ego issue that Paulson got in, in which there was no easy way for him to back down personally when the British said they wanted a guarantee, so it was a testosterone issue. So that’s the list—choose what you like.
Was [New York Senator] Chuck Schumer ever a role in the film, or is not relevant in the discussion?
Ferguson: Schumer is certainly relevant. He has a mixed record. There’s many ways in which he’s been an advocate for the financial services industry, including some ways that are not entirely tasteful. He also a couple times tried to do something good…One time he tried to get mortgage loans back under bankruptcy costs, to get mortgages covered in the result of bankruptcy which they currently are not, as a result of lobbying by the mortgage lending industry. In that, he failed, but he tried.
In regard more generally, there are many things I would have liked to put in the film. I’d like to put more about congressional cases that were blocked by lobbying by the financial services industry. There are so many things I’d have loved to put in the film, and there just wasn’t the time.
Chuck [Morris], was there anything you would have loved to see in the film that you did not?
Morris: Actually, I should say, when I originally talked to Charles about this, I thought this is a film that you just couldn’t make. It’s too complicated, too much stuff, too hard to capture all the conversations and stuff. I think it came out just fantastic. I like the whole thing. I really like that it wasn’t a partisan blow at that party...
Let me just give you some numbers here. The way the commerce department measures national product is something called value added. Over the years, the value added by the financial section has been somewhere between 12% and 14%. The same time, the share of corporate profits by the financial sector has always been higher than their value added, it looks a little too higher. In the 2000s, they were getting 40% of all corporate profits, and you only get that with huge amounts of leverage, with huge amounts of risk. And you saw that happen, it really started at 2002 and stayed at the 38, 39% level, and of course that’s why you see this huge surge of income to the top 1%, and they’re not putting any of it back—it’s just money for them. And the real problem is that they did it again in 2009. In 2008, it went down to 8.5%, but in 2009 it crept back to 30%.
And another thing I should mention is that, and we’ve not begun to deal with this at all, is the no cutbacks in the financial sectors jobs. And we’ve really got to cut all those places down. I realized that the sector has lost more jobs than any other place, but its all been outside of New York City in the smaller banks, regional banks, that are actually doing banking, and the guys at the top have covered themselves, and they haven’t changed at all.
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